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Emotional intelligence (EI) is the ability to reason accurately 
about emotions, and to use emotions and emotional knowledge 
to enhance thought (Mayer, Roberts, & Barsade, 2008). It was 
introduced just over 25 years ago (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), and 
popularized just over 20 years ago (Goleman, 1995). EI cap-
tured people’s imaginations because of the intuitive appeal of 
the argument that it is an important determinant of success. The 
results of empirical research, however, are often inconsistent 
with the common intuitions about its role in various forms of 
success.1 Some studies found that EI predicts important out-
comes, such as the quality of interpersonal relationships (Lopes, 
Salovey, Côté, & Beers, 2005), leadership emergence (Emery, 
2012), and transformational leadership (Rubin, Munz, & 
Bommer, 2005), but other studies did not find these relation-
ships (Føllesdal & Hagtvet, 2013; Sosik & Megerian, 1999). 
Still other studies reported relationships between EI and other 
important outcomes, but only under some circumstances (Côté 
& Miners, 2006; Fahr, Seo, & Tesluk, 2012).
EI remains controversial with respect to its validity—and 
therefore its utility—due, in part, to these mixed results. The 
equivocal results beg the question “Why are the research find-
ings not more consistent with our intuitions about the role that 
EI plays in various forms of success?” It is possible that peo-
ple’s intuitions are wrong, and that EI is at best a weak and 
inconsistent determinant of success (Grant, 2014). Alternatively, 
it is possible that EI is an important determinant of success, but 
research on it is hampered. In particular, researchers still use 
multiple definitions and conceptualizations of what is ostensi-
bly EI. Furthermore, theories of the relationships between EI 
and criteria are still underdeveloped (Côté, 2014; Ybarra, Kross, 
& Sanchez-Burks, 2014).
Here we focus on another way in which research on EI is 
hampered. Several researchers have asserted that the measure-
ment of EI is one of the major limitations that remains (Conte, 
2005; Maul, 2012a, 2012b; Roberts et al., 2006). The evidence 
presented by these authors (and others) casts doubt on whether 
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all measures of EI are equally valid, and confirms that its meas-
urement is a limitation of the extant research. Our concern, 
however, is wider than measurement alone. Our concern is also 
with the psychometric theory that underlies the validity of 
measures, as well as the empirical processes that can be used to 
determine whether the psychometric theory is supported for a 
particular measure.
We believe that one of the reasons a wide variety of meas-
ures continues to be used is that researchers and test developers 
have not heeded calls to conceptualize validity in theoretical 
terms, and to evaluate theories about validity more directly 
(Borsboom, Mellenbergh, & van Heerden, 2004; Maul, 2012b). 
In response to these calls, we adopt an approach to understand 
the concept of validity and to assess validity that draws on the 
innovative work of Bornstein (2011), Borsboom et al. (2004), 
Embretson (1983), and Messick (1989). We focus on the theo-
retical processes that link variation in a construct with variation 
on the responses to the items of a measure, and on the research 
methods that directly evaluate the validity of those theoretical 
processes. This approach to understanding and to evaluating 
validity is consistent with modern psychometric theories of 
validity, but it is often inconsistent with the practice of validity 
research. The approach that we describe should therefore be 
viewed as a complement to what, historically, has been the 
focus of validity research, namely, test content, internal struc-
ture, and relationships with other variables (Bornstein, 2011).
The goal of this article is to describe an approach that enables 
a more complete evaluation of the validity of EI measures. We 
first review the dominant psychometric theory of validity before 
we turn our attention to a source of evidence for validity that is 
often overlooked by researchers and test developers, namely, evi-
dence based on response processes. We then present a sequence 
of steps for how to obtain this source of evidence and, therefore, 
for how to evaluate extant measures of EI more carefully and to 
improve the development of new measures of EI.
Validity
According to Messick (1989) and to the Standards for 
Educational and Psychological Testing (American Educational 
Research Association, American Psychological Association, 
& National Council on Measurement in Education, 2014), 
validity is an integrated evaluative judgment of the degree to 
which empirical evidence and theoretical rationales support 
the interpretation of test scores for proposed uses of a test. 
From this perspective, there are not multiple types of validity 
but, instead, validity is a unitary concept on which different 
sources of evidence should be brought to bear. The Standards 
identifies five sources of evidence for validity, namely, evi-
dence based on (1) test content, (2) item response processes, 
(3) internal structure, (4) relationships with other variables, 
and (5) the consequences of testing. The first four sources of 
evidence, together, constitute evidential (research-based) 
validity, or a measure’s potential to provide accurate, useful, 
and unbiased information (Bornstein, 2011). The fifth source 
of evidence constitutes consequential (impact-based) validity, 
or the extent to which a measure realizes this potential in prac-
tice (Bornstein, 2011). We limit our discussion to evidential 
validity to preserve the focus on the interpretation of test 
scores independent of the consequences of their use, and here-
after validity should be understood as such.
The validity of measures has often been assessed in terms of 
the content validity of their items (i.e., Standards, Source 1), the 
psychometric properties of the measure (i.e., Standards, Source 
3), and the relationships that are hypothesized to exist between 
the focal construct and the other constructs in its nomological 
network (i.e., Standards, Source 4; Bornstein, 2011). In other 
words, the validity of measures has rarely been assessed in 
terms of response processes (i.e., Standards, Source 2; 
Bornstein, 2011). We therefore believe that research designed to 
understand response processes should be a helpful addition to 
validity research in general, and to validity research in the con-
tentious domain of EI in particular.
Response processes
Response processes are the theoretical (mental) processes that 
link variation in a construct with variation on the responses to 
the items of a measure. Evidence for validity based on response 
processes is therefore obtained through identification of the 
theoretical processes that intervene between the presentation of 
the items of a measure and the responses to those items, and 
measurement or manipulation of the theoretical processes to 
evaluate their effect on the measurement outcomes (Bornstein, 
2011; Embretson, 1983). If a measure captures an ability that 
underlies EI, then it should be possible to demonstrate that peo-
ple who complete the measure engage in the mental processes 
that are associated with the operation of the ability. If the rele-
vant mental processes are operative and have the theorized 
effect on the responses to the items (e.g., a positive relationship 
exists between the sophistication or the speed of their operation 
and the level of performance on the measure), then it increases 
confidence that the ability is responsible for the choice of 
responses to the items.
Embretson (1983) introduced the concept of construct repre-
sentation, the focus of which is on response processes, to com-
plement the way in which validity was often assessed (i.e., 
through an examination of nomological networks). Her work 
was primarily in the domain of cognitive modeling, in which 
she advocated for the development of theoretical models that 
specify the mental processes that operate during the completion 
of a measure, the creation of items that vary in the extent to 
which they tax the operation of specific mental processes, and 
an evaluation of the theoretical model’s capacity to (accurately) 
predict the level of performance on each item. Researchers have 
since explored the response processes that are involved in the 
completion of traditional intelligence tests and other similar 
tests of abilities and aptitudes, and introduced additional meth-
ods to facilitate the evaluation of response processes (Embretson 
& Gorin, 2001; Kane, 2001; Mislevy, 2007).
The work of Borsboom et al. (2004) encouraged further 
attention to response processes. The crux of validity is whether 
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a measure serves as a faithful indicator of the construct that it is 
designed to measure or, to be cruder, whether it measures what 
it is supposed to measure (Kelley, 1927). Borsboom and col-
leagues argued that evidence for validity cannot reside in the 
relationships between two or more measures or, relatedly, in the 
relationships between the constructs in a nomological network. 
The pattern of relationships that defines a nomological network 
can provide only indirect evidence for validity, because it does 
not speak to the crux of validity. From their perspective, evi-
dence for validity must reside in the relationship between a con-
struct and the measurement outcomes. In particular, Borsboom 
and colleagues argued that validity must be established through 
substantive theory about response processes or, in other words, 
about the causal role of a construct in determining the value of 
measurement outcomes and in direct tests of the theory (see 
Podsakoff, Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Klinger, 2013, for an 
application to the domain of personality traits).
Bornstein (2011) also focused on response processes, or 
what he termed a process-focused model of test score validity. 
He identified six categories of tests, each of which requires the 
operation of a different class of mental processes. For example, 
the scores on performance tests are derived from on-line 
responding to structured tasks (i.e., problem-solving), whereas 
the scores on self-attribution tests are derived from reflective 
processes that are used to determine the extent to which a person 
attributes personality traits, feelings, thoughts, etcetera to him/
herself. He also identified four context-based influences as 
potential moderators (e.g., affective state) that can help to dem-
onstrate the operation of a class of mental processes. For exam-
ple, a strong affective reaction that creates a cognitive load 
should affect the scores on a performance test to a greater extent 
than the scores on a self-attribution test (thus helping to eluci-
date the class of mental processes in operation).
Our approach to a more complete evaluation of the validity 
of EI measures is grounded in the work that we have described. 
It uses construct representation, the refinement to the concept of 
validity that appears in the work of Embretson (1983), as its 
foundation. It embraces the work of Borsboom et al. (2004) by 
advocating for the measurement of the theoretical processes that 
link variation in a construct with variation on the responses to 
the items of a measure, and the work of Bornstein (2011) by 
advocating for the experimental manipulation of those pro-
cesses. Our approach is thus, we hope, a logical synthesis and 
extension of the extant literature.
Our approach is also consistent with Fiori’s (2009) dual- 
process framework for the conscious and the automatic (mental) 
processes associated with EI. The majority of research on EI has 
explicitly or tacitly focused on conscious processes. Some of 
the most emotionally intelligent behaviours, however, are likely 
to be automatic: automatic processes consume fewer cognitive 
resources than their conscious counterparts and therefore leave 
more cognitive resources to respond to the particular features of 
a situation. Fiori (2009) encouraged researchers to use experi-
mental paradigms to explore the mental processes that underlie 
the operation of EI, in combination with the more traditional 
correlational analyses that are often used to understand the 
construct of EI. Our approach also calls for an exploration of the 
mental processes that underlie the operation of EI and for the 
use of experimental paradigms to aid in the exploration, but for 
a different application (i.e., to evaluate validity). The specific 
examples that Fiori (2009) provided to test the automatic pro-
cesses that underlie EI might prove to be just as useful within 
the context of validity research.
emotional intelligence and Validity
The previous arguments lead us to believe that to help deter-
mine the validity of extant measures of EI and to improve the 
development of new measures of EI, it is necessary to describe 
the theoretical processes that intervene between the construct 
of EI and the responses to the items of a measure. We now pre-
sent a four-step, systematic approach to help determine how 
variation in the construct of EI causes variation in measure-
ment outcomes.
We focus on a subdimension of the first branch of EI (i.e., the 
perceiving emotion branch), emotion recognition ability. Our 
focus on a subdimension of EI is consistent with the need for 
future theoretical development to identify the subdimensions of 
branches that are relevant to a phenomenon (e.g., Yip & Côté, 
2013). If a theory is overly inclusive with respect to the specific 
subdimensions, then the effects of the relevant ones will be 
weakened or remain undetected.
Adopting our approach highlights the need to precisely iden-
tify the mechanism(s) that link variation in an ability with vari-
ation on the responses to the items of a measure. The movement 
to examine the specific abilities that underlie the branches of EI, 
however, is nascent. There is limited theoretical development 
and empirical evidence to help researchers determine how, 
exactly, some of the specific abilities operate (see the Discussion 
section for further details). This is a significant gap in the EI 
literature that, itself, warrants more attention (Fiori, 2009; Maul, 
2012b). It is even difficult to identify all of the relevant mecha-
nisms within the relatively well-developed emotion recognition 
ability literature. The arguments that we present for emotion 
recognition ability are consistent with our understanding of the 
extant literature, but they should nonetheless be viewed as illus-
trative and, at this point in time, as plausible hypotheses rather 
than known facts.
Step 1: Define the Ability
Researchers who aim to establish and to test the theoretical pro-
cesses that link variation in a construct with variation on the 
responses to the items of a measure must first establish a clear, 
concise, and complete definition of that construct. A definition of 
this sort facilitates the articulation of the theoretical processes that 
are involved, because it invites consideration of the processes that 
are likely to be relevant to the link and of the processes that are 
unlikely to be relevant to the link (Locke, 2003; Whetten, 1989). 
An unclear or incomplete definition, by contrast, invites the inap-
propriate inclusion or exclusion of theoretical processes. We 
define emotion recognition ability (ERA) as follows: “Emotion 
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recognition ability is the capacity of a person to accurately iden-
tify the emotions that other people express” (Ickes, Stinson, 
Bissonette, & Garcia, 1990; Levenson & Ruef, 1992).
Step 2: Describe the Operation of the Ability
With a clear, concise, and complete definition in place, research-
ers could then describe the general process that operates when a 
person uses the ability. First, in the case of ERA, a person devotes 
attention to information about the emotions of another person. 
The information could be verbalized (i.e., “I am angry”), or 
encoded in speech (e.g., vocal tone, volume, and prosody), facial 
expressions (e.g., position or movement of the eyebrows, direc-
tion or movement of the gaze, and contour of the mouth), bodily 
posture (e.g., position of the head and shoulders, placement of 
the arms, and angle of the torso), or bodily movement (e.g., dis-
placement of the aforementioned anatomy; Bänziger, Mortillaro, 
& Scherer, 2012; Cordaro, Keltner, Tshering, Wangchuk, & 
Flynn, 2016; Matsumoto, Hwang, & Frank, 2016).
Second, the person must compare this information to stored 
information (i.e., concepts or templates) about which emotion, 
and which level of intensity of the emotion, are associated with 
a particular configuration of speech, facial expression, bodily 
posture, and bodily movement (Adolphs, 2002). The accuracy 
of the stored information, and the speed with which it is 
retrieved, assembled, and compared, will vary from person to 
person as a function of an ability to discern information about 
emotions from social interactions (Nisbett et al., 2012), and as a 
function of formal and informal instruction about the role of 
emotions in interpersonal relationships (Elfenbein, 2006; 
Saarni, 1999).
Third, the person must interpret the emotion and the inten-
sity of the emotion within the specific context in which the emo-
tion is unfolding (Trope, 1986). The context is likely to be 
viewed and understood through multiple, complementary 
lenses: from an understanding of the norms of a culture to the 
voice climate of a group to the closeness of our relationship 
with the other person (Clark & Finkel, 2005; Matsumoto et al., 
2016; Morrison, Wheeler-Smith, & Kamdar, 2011).
Step 3: Develop a Theory of Response 
Behaviour
A description of the general process that operates when a person 
employs an ability allows researchers to hypothesize the spe-
cific theoretical mechanisms that link variation in a construct 
with variation on the responses to the items of a measure, and 
thus develop a theory of response behaviour.
The description of the process that operates when a person 
employs his or her ERA explicitly or implicitly suggests that 
pattern recognition, speed of recall from memory, working 
memory capacity, and the depth and the breadth of knowledge 
about the display of emotions should all contribute to accurate 
observations during a social interaction and to choosing the 
correct responses to the items of a measure (Adolphs, 2002; 
Lynn et al., 2016; Nook, Lindquist, & Zaki, 2015; Zaki, Weber, 
Bolger, & Ochsner, 2009). It therefore stands to reason, for 
example, that people with a high level of ERA should engage in 
more of the behaviours that enable accurate pattern recognition 
than people with a lower level of this ability (or in the same 
behaviours as them, but with greater efficiency). The increase 
in this behaviour or in its efficiency, in turn, should lead to 
more accurate observations during a social interaction and 
faster (accurate) observations and, similarly, to the choice of 
more accurate responses to the items of a measure and faster 
(accurate) responses.
Step 4: Test the Theory of Response Behaviour
The identification and articulation of the mechanisms that 
underlie an ability would enable researchers to generate a list of 
measurable mental activities, attributes, and processes. This list 
would then facilitate tests of whether variation in the ability 
results in the predicted variation on responses to the items of a 
measure through a particular mechanism (i.e., ERA and pattern 
recognition in the running example).
We outline three broad, complementary strategies that can be 
used to determine whether a particular mechanism links variation 
in a construct with variation on responses to the items of a meas-
ure: measurement of mediation, moderation of process, and eval-
uation of alternatives. We also provide examples of the application 
of the strategies to one of the most popular measures of EI (and 
therefore of ERA within the domain of EI research), the Mayer–
Salovey–Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT; Mayer, 
Salovey, & Caruso, 2002), to illustrate their application.
Step 4a: Identification of Multiple Levels of 
the Focal Construct
Before we proceed, we discuss a requirement that is central to 
each of the strategies; namely, the identification of multiple lev-
els of the focal construct (in our case, ERA). Researchers can 
identify multiple levels of the focal construct through an initial 
assessment that identifies people who differ with respect to their 
level of the ability. After identifying multiple levels of the focal 
construct, it is then possible to administer the focal measure 
and, in turn, to determine whether variation in the level of the 
focal construct results in the predicted variation on responses to 
the items of the focal measure (i.e., whether people with a high 
level of the ability outperform people with a lower level of the 
ability on the focal measure).
The initial assessment could involve the administration of 
one or more extant measures of the focal construct, if such meas-
ures are available (e.g., Diagnostic Analysis of Nonverbal 
Accuracy: Nowicki, & Duke, 1994; Geneva Emotion Recognition 
Test: Schlegel, Grandjean, & Scherer, 2014). While it requires 
empirical validation, it might also be possible to administer 
extant measures of the more basic abilities that underlie the focal 
construct (i.e., Stratum 1 factors in Carroll’s [1993] model of 
intelligence). For example, it is difficult to imagine that some of 
the basic abilities that underlie the broad ability of visual percep-
tion (e.g., spatial relations) and the broad ability of auditory 
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perception (e.g., speech sound discrimination) do not also under-
lie ERA. The initial assessment could also involve interviews or 
other procedures conducted by subject matter experts (e.g., clin-
ical identification of individuals with and without disorders that 
are associated with emotional processing deficits, such as schiz-
ophrenia; Derntl et al., 2009). The use of more than one approach 
for the initial assessment, if possible, and of structural equation 
modeling would be desirable. It would prevent reliance on any 
one measure to capture the focal construct, and allow for the 
control of random and systematic measurement error.
Step 4b: Strategies to Test a Theory of 
Response Behaviour
We now describe the three strategies that can be used to deter-
mine whether a particular mechanism links variation in a con-
struct with variation on the responses to the items of a measure.
Strategy 1: Measurement of mediation. The first strategy 
requires researchers to identify multiple levels of the focal con-
struct and to measure the theorized mechanism(s) that link vari-
ation in the construct with variation on responses to the items of 
a measure (Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). The identification 
of multiple levels of the focal construct could be accomplished 
through one or more of the approaches described in Step 4a. A 
measure of the mechanism(s) and, in turn, the focal measure 
could then be administered. Mediation could be formally tested 
using the procedures advocated by Preacher and Hayes (2004) 
or MacKinnon, Lockwood, Hoffman, West, and Sheets (2002). 
This strategy therefore leads to confirmation that a high level of 
an ability leads to better performance on the focal measure than 
a lower level of the ability, and that the theorized mechanism(s) 
help us to understand why a high level of the ability results in 
better performance on the focal measure.
For the Faces Task of the MSCEIT (Mayer, Salovey, & 
Caruso, 2002), eye-tracking could be used as an index of the 
mechanism in the running example, pattern recognition. The 
hypothesis is that people with a high level of ERA will focus on 
the relevant features of the stimulus that is presented in each item 
of the measure (i.e., on the specific muscle movements captured 
in a photograph of a facial expression that, together, characterize 
the emotion that is present) and neglect the irrelevant features of 
the stimulus. It is also possible that people focus on the same 
(relevant) features of the stimulus regardless of their ERA, but 
people with a high level of ERA enact the behaviour faster (i.e., 
more efficiently). According to the theorized mechanism, the 
more precise (or faster) pattern of eye movements of people with 
a high level of ERA will enable them to choose the correct 
responses to the items of the focal measure more often (or more 
quickly). The hypothesized relationships between ERA, pattern 
recognition (as indexed by eye-tracking), and performance on 
the Faces Task would then be tested for mediation.
Strategy 2: Moderation of process. The second strategy 
involves the identification of multiple levels of the focal con-
struct and the subsequent manipulation of a moderator to 
determine if the moderator changes the relationship between the 
construct and the responses to the items of a measure (Spencer 
et al., 2005). The second strategy does not require the mecha-
nism to be measured. The second strategy, instead, requires the 
identification of a moderator that enhances or diminishes the 
operation of the mechanism and, importantly, only the mecha-
nism (otherwise the interpretation of any effect of the moderator 
becomes ambiguous). This strategy is helpful when the mecha-
nism is difficult or even impossible to measure in the context of 
a particular study (Spencer et al., 2005). If the moderator 
enhances (or diminishes) the effect of the mechanism, then 
there should be a weaker relationship between the focal con-
struct and the measurement outcomes, because the mechanism 
will be active (or inactive) regardless of the level of the focal 
construct. Moderation could be formally tested using the proce-
dures advocated by Aiken and West (1991). The application of 
this strategy therefore leads to confirmation that a moderator 
can weaken the relationship between the ability and the level of 
performance on the focal measure through its capacity to facili-
tate or interfere with the operation of the theorized mechanism(s).
For example, in a control condition, the photographs of 
facial expressions from the Faces Task of the MSCEIT would be 
presented as normal. There should be a significant difference 
between the performance of people with a high level of ERA 
and people with a lower level of ERA. In an experimental con-
dition, the photographs of facial expressions from the Faces 
Task would be presented upside down. Past research has shown 
that this manipulation interferes with the processing of facial 
features—the hypothesized mechanism in this example (Derntl, 
Seidel, Kainz, & Carbon, 2009). There should be a smaller dif-
ference between the performance of people with a high level of 
ERA and people with a lower level of ERA in the experimental 
condition (i.e., when the moderator is introduced). The scores of 
the former are likely to drop substantially, whereas the ordinar-
ily low scores of the latter are unlikely to drop as far. People 
with a high level of ERA and people with a low level of ERA are 
therefore likely to obtain similar scores. The hypothesized rela-
tionships between ERA, the moderator (i.e., experimental con-
dition), and performance on the Faces Task would then be tested 
for moderation. If the anticipated pattern of results is obtained, 
then it would suggest that pattern recognition is an operative 
mechanism, as theorized.
Strategy 3: Evaluation of alternatives. The third strategy 
requires researchers to identify multiple levels of the focal con-
struct, and to evaluate alternative explanations for a particular 
mechanism that links variation in a construct with variation on 
the responses to the items of a measure. There are likely to be a 
number of mechanisms that compete with or complement the 
focal mechanism (i.e., the mechanism that was identified 
through the development of a theory of response behaviour) 
with respect to its role of carrying (at least some of) the varia-
tion in a construct to variation on the responses to the items of a 
measure. It is therefore important to demonstrate that the focal 
mechanism is operative even when the alternative mechanisms 
are incorporated into an experimental paradigm or controlled 
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for in a statistical model. Researchers would need to identify 
multiple levels of the focal construct, administer an experimen-
tal paradigm that incorporates the focal mechanism and the 
alternative mechanism(s) (or measures of the focal mechanism 
and the alternative mechanism[s]), and finally administer the 
focal measure. Complex mediation models that can accommo-
date more than one mediator could be formally tested using the 
procedures advocated by Williams and MacKinnon (2008). 
Researchers would then be able to determine whether the focal 
mechanism is still operative even in the presence of the alterna-
tive mechanism(s). In other words, the application of this strat-
egy requires confirmation that a high level of an ability results 
in better performance on the focal measure than a lower level of 
the ability through the theorized mechanism(s), and not exclu-
sively through the operation of different mechanisms.2
For example, in the case of pattern recognition, it could be 
argued that the operative mechanism is, instead, increased atten-
tion to or concentration on the stimulus. This would suggest that 
the eye movements of people with a high or a low level of ERA 
are indistinguishable; it is just that the former spends more time 
doing it than the latter and this explains their superior perfor-
mance on the Faces Task of the MSCEIT. This alternative expla-
nation could be ruled out by a direct comparison of the pattern 
of eye movements exhibited by people who differ with respect 
to their level of ERA to verify that the patterns are different. The 
pattern of people with a high level of ERA should be more pre-
cise than the pattern of people with a lower level of it, and the 
average response latency of the former should be shorter (as per 
the theorized mechanism), not longer (as per the alternative 
explanation), than the latter.
discussion
To improve the validity of measures of EI, we put a strong 
emphasis on developing a substantive theory about the theoreti-
cal processes that link variation in a construct with variation on 
the responses to the items of a measure and direct tests of the 
theory. Drawing on the innovative work of Embretson (1983), 
Messick (1989), Borsboom et al. (2004), and Bornstein (2011), 
we argued that research on response processes is an important 
but often neglected aspect of validity research. To promote 
research of this sort, we described a four-step approach that 
should help to determine whether extant measures of EI are 
valid and to improve the development of new measures of EI. 
We summarize the four steps that constitute the approach in 
Table 1.
The approach that we described should be helpful in a num-
ber of ways. It will help researchers and test developers to 
assess the validity of extant measures of EI, as noted, and to 
create (a) variations of extant measures of EI that are designed 
to facilitate their administration (e.g., short forms), (b) the next 
generation of extant measures of EI, and (c) new measures of 
new abilities that are proposed to underlie EI. All of this should 
have a knock-on effect, in so far as the introduction of new, 
improved measures of EI will build the confidence of research-
ers and invite further exploration of its role in various forms of 
success (and failure). The approach, ultimately, should facili-
tate an improvement to the quality of research on EI through an 
improvement of its measurement.
Caveats
Our four-step approach provides a range of possibilities to deter-
mine whether a mechanism links variation in a construct with 
variation on the responses to the items of a measure. For exam-
ple, consider its application to the ability to select emotion regu-
lation strategies (ASERS) during the development of a new 
measure. Step 1: ASERS is the capacity of a person to choose 
strategies that are likely to create desired emotions (Côté, 2014). 
Imagine that for each item of the new measure, respondents are 
presented with a description of a situation in which they are 
(ostensibly) interacting with another person, an emotion regula-
tion goal for that situation, and a short video in which the person 
with whom they are (ostensibly) interacting addresses them. 
Respondents must choose the response option that maximizes 
the likelihood of achieving the emotion regulation goal. Step 2: 
The operation of ASERS requires mental representation of the 
range of emotion regulation strategies that exist, consideration of 
the features of the strategies and the situation to determine the 
likelihood of each strategy achieving the goal, and awareness of 
the resources that are available (e.g., mental energy; Aldao, 
2013; Gross, 2015; Saunders, Milyavskaya, & Inzlicht, 2015; 
Sheppes, Scheibe, Suri, Radu, & Gross, 2014). Step 3: Speed of 
recall from memory, executive function, fluid intelligence, and 
the depth and the breadth of knowledge about emotion regula-
tion strategies should all contribute to choosing the correct 
responses to the items of the new measure (Messina, Bianco, 
Sambin, & Viviani, 2015; Ochsner & Gross, 2008; Optiz, Lee, 
Gross, & Urry, 2014; Zelazo & Cunningham, 2007). Step 4a: 
The initial assessment of ASERS could involve, for example, the 
administration of extant measures of the ability (e.g., Situational 
Test of Emotion Management; MacCann & Roberts, 2008), and 
the clinical identification of individuals with and without disor-
ders that are associated with emotion dysregulation (e.g., social 
anxiety disorder; Gross, 2015). Step 4b, Strategy 1: measurement 
of mediation: High-frequency heart rate variability (HF-HRV) 
could be used as an index of one potential underlying mecha-
nism, executive function. HF-HRV is a measure of autonomic 
contributions to cardiac functioning that decreases when people 
complete tasks that recruit executive function, including emotion 
regulation tasks (Elliot, Payen, Brisswalter, Cury, & Thayer, 
2011). The decrease, in turn, is associated with a lower level of 
performance on such tasks (Elliot et al., 2011; Thayer, Hansen, 
Saus-Rose, & Johnsen, 2009; Thayer & Lane, 2000). We hypoth-
esize that people with a high level of ASERS will exhibit a 
smaller decrease in HF-HRV than people with a lower level of 
the ability when the emotion evoked by a video requires regula-
tion. The smaller decrease in HF-HRV of people with a high 
level of ASERS, which reflects more efficient and effective cog-
nitive functioning, should enable them to choose the correct 
responses to the items of the new measure more often. The 
hypothesized relations between ASERS, executive function (as 
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indexed by HF-HRV), and performance on the new measure 
would be tested for mediation. Support for the hypothesized rela-
tionships would indicate that there is evidence for the validity of 
the new measure based on response processes.
At the same time, however, we acknowledge that there is a 
limit to the range of possibilities offered by our approach. There 
are some abilities that might require the identification of people 
who differ with respect to their level of the ability, but for which 
there are a limited number of (valid) extant measures and a lim-
ited number of alternative means to identify them.
Challenges
As previously noted, we acknowledge that it is currently difficult 
to identify the mechanism(s) that link variation in some of the 
specific abilities that underlie the branches of EI to the responses 
on a focal measure. There is limited theoretical development and 
empirical evidence to help researchers determine how, exactly, 
some of the specific abilities operate. The approach described by 
Bornstein (2011) may be helpful in this regard, because the 
approach does not require the measurement of mental processes. 
His approach, instead, relies on the nature of the test itself to iden-
tify the mental processes that are likely to be operative, and on 
context-based influences as potential moderators that can help to 
demonstrate the operation of the mental processes.
conclusion
We are keenly aware of the challenge that is presented by 
research of the sort that we have described. This challenge helps 
to explain why the arguments presented by some scholars (e.g., 
Bornstein, 2011; Borsboom et al., 2004; Embretson, 1983; 
Messick, 1989) have shaped modern psychometric theories of 
validity more than they have shaped the practice of validity 
assessment. As Bornstein (2011) noted, it is difficult to map the 
idealized theories of validity advocated by psychometricians 
onto the messy practice of validity research. We nonetheless 
believe that it is important to provide evidence of this sort when 
possible, and to strive to obtain more evidence as the science of 
EI evolves and more evidence becomes available.
We hope that, above all else, we have raised awareness of an 
important issue for researchers and test developers in general 
and within the domain of EI research in particular. The four-step 
approach that we described and the application of the strategies 
that appear under Step 4b represent an early attempt to explain 
how to obtain a “new” source of evidence for validity in the 
domain of EI. As such, we recognize that they are imperfect. We 
nonetheless believe that it is important to obtain evidence for 
validity that is based on response processes, in addition to the 
evidence that is typically obtained. It will help to elucidate the 
processes that underlie the operation of EI, and enable more 
stringent tests of and therefore stronger conclusions about the 
validity of its measures.
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notes
1 We limit our discussion of EI to ability models for reasons that are 
described elsewhere (e.g., Côté, 2014).
2 Consistent with the arguments presented by Borsboom et al. (2004) 
about the limitations of nomological networks as a source of evidence 
for validity, the evaluation of alternative explanations is necessary but 
insufficient to establish validity. The third strategy therefore comple-
ments the first two strategies.
table 1. Checklist for the evaluation of validity based on response behaviour.
□ Step 1: define the ability
□ Step 2: describe the operation of the ability
  Describe the mental processes that operate when a person uses the ability
□ Step 3: develop a theory of response behaviour
   Use the description of the mental processes to identify the mechanism(s) through which variations in the ability cause variations in the item 
responses on the focal measure
□ Step 4: test the theory of response behaviour
   Test the mechanism(s) through which variations in the ability cause variations in the item responses on the focal measure using one or more of the 
following strategies:
Step 4a: Identify multiple levels of the focal construct
   □ conduct an initial assessment
     Conduct an initial assessment that identifies people who differ with respect to their level of the ability
Step 4b: Strategies to test a theory of response behaviour
   □ Measurement of mediation
      Measure the proposed mechanism(s) and then test whether it mediates the relationship between the ability and the item responses on the 
focal measure
   □ Moderation of process
     Test whether a moderator alters the effect of variation in the ability on variation in the item responses on the focal measure
   □ evaluation of alternatives
     Evaluate whether the focal mechanism continues to serve as a mediator when alternative mechanisms are taken into consideration
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